Some people seem to believe that if the pirs, mashayikh and *ulama* unite, it may be possible to establish an Islamic state within just twenty-four hours!

Behind this perception may lie respect for the scholarly community, confidence in its leadership, and a desire to establish a state system based on Islamic principles.

However, treating the establishment of a state—a complex political process—as an outcome that can be achieved simply through unity among religious leaders is an oversimplification of reality.

Several observations are relevant in this regard.

## First,

Unity among the pirs, mashayikh and *ulama* is a widespread public expectation. A substantial section of religiously observant people want scholars to transcend mutual disputes, partisan narrowness and competition for leadership, and unite in pursuit of broader religious interests.

Differences of opinion may exist among them, but such differences should not become sources of mutual hostility, resentment or permanent division. Rather, a culture should develop in which they cooperate on matters of common concern while maintaining mutual respect and tolerance where their views differ. This expectation is undoubtedly reasonable and positive.

## Second,

Unity among scholars can play an important role in increasing their social and political influence. If they work together in a coordinated manner, they will be better positioned to articulate their views and advance their demands on matters relating to religious education, morality, social justice, public welfare and religious values. Their influence on political parties and state policymakers may also increase. Such unity may even create opportunities to secure demands of common interest and contribute to public policymaking.

However, exerting political influence, winning elections and effectively governing a state are three distinct matters.

Although unity is important for the first, achieving the other two requires the fulfilment of many additional conditions.

## Third,

Under the present circumstances, the prospect of comprehensive unity among the pirs, mashayikh and the scholarly community appears extremely limited. Long-standing differences, mutual distrust, competition for leadership and organisational conflicts persist among scholars, shaykhs, pirs, and various parties and subgroups. Not all these disputes are necessarily baseless; some arise from genuine scholarly, jurisprudential and ideological questions.

Nevertheless, the mindset and institutional culture required to cooperate on matters of common interest despite differences of opinion have not developed sufficiently. In these circumstances, it is difficult to expect comprehensive unity among all the pirs, mashayikh and scholars in the foreseeable future.

That is why people sometimes joke that scholars have at least reached a consensus on one matter: they will never unite! Although exaggerated, this remark reflects the public frustration that has accumulated over the existing divisions.

One point, however, needs to be clarified: even if comprehensive unity is unattainable, effective cooperation in areas of common interest is not impossible. Rather than waiting for all differences to disappear, joint initiatives can be undertaken on matters where agreement already exists. Mutual cooperation is possible even while individuals and groups retain their distinct identities. This is how a realistic form of unity can begin to take shape.

## Fourth,

Religious credibility and electoral confidence are not the same thing. A vast number of people in Bangladesh respect scholars, listen to their religious discourses and seek their advice in their personal and social lives.

However, this respect does not automatically translate into confidence in their political leadership or votes in their favour. Considering someone credible in religious matters is fundamentally different from being prepared to entrust that person with the responsibility of governing the state. Alongside ideology and religious identity, voters also consider leadership qualities, integrity, administrative competence, economic planning, public security, employment opportunities and overall capacity for governance.

Therefore, it would be inappropriate to equate public respect for scholars directly with political support for them. Instead, it is necessary to examine why religious credibility does not translate into electoral confidence in every case and what kinds of political, organisational and social initiatives are needed to bridge this gap.

## Fifth,

Effective and institutional engagement between religious leadership and the public needs to be expanded further. Scholars already maintain contact with a significant section of society through mosques, madrasas, *wa'z* gatherings and religious institutions.

However, in modern political reality, public engagement means more than religious communication alone. Practical initiatives to address poverty, contribute to education and healthcare, create employment, respond to disasters, promote local development, protect citizens' rights and address the future of women and young people are also important.

Although various individuals and institutions within the scholarly community already contribute in these areas, their efforts need to become more coordinated, extensive, institutionalised and visible. If religious leaders consistently contribute to resolving the practical problems of public life, public confidence in them may deepen further.

People do not merely want to hear declarations of ideals; they also want to see how those ideals can bring positive changes to their lives, livelihoods, rights and security.

## Sixth,

The concept of establishing an Islamic state must be articulated within a specific political, constitutional and policy framework. What exactly is meant by an “Islamic state”? What principles will govern legislation? What role will *shura* (consultation) play? How will the accountability of rulers be ensured? How will judicial independence be protected? And how will the rights and religious freedoms of citizens be safeguarded?

These questions require clear answers. Realistic plans are also needed for the economy, education, healthcare, employment, corruption control, administrative reform and social security.

Even where there is a general commitment to Islamic principles, differences of opinion may exist among scholars and Islamist political groups on these matters. Therefore, uniting around a common slogan alone is insufficient. What is needed is agreement on policy, the determination of priorities and the formulation of implementable programmes.

Preparing answers to these questions before assuming responsibility for governing the state is a mark of political maturity.

## Seventh,

There is a significant difference between acquiring state power and governing the state effectively. Winning an election does not automatically confer effective control over all state institutions and power structures. The administration, bureaucracy, law enforcement agencies, judiciary, security apparatus, economic interest groups and various influential actors in policymaking all play important roles in governance.

In political discourse, such informal centres of power are sometimes explained through the concept of the “deep state.” However, it would not be appropriate to interpret every political obstacle or disagreement within the state as the work of a deep state.

The central issue is that adequate knowledge and preparation are required concerning the functioning of state institutions, the balance of power, constitutional constraints and administrative realities. Effective governance requires competent personnel, policy experience, administrative planning and the capacity to operate existing institutions lawfully and efficiently. Unity among religious leaders cannot substitute for these preparations.

## Eighth,

International politics and geopolitical realities cannot be ignored either. In today's world, the political trajectory of a state is not determined solely by domestic public support. The interests of neighbouring countries, regional security, international trade, foreign investment, loans, diplomatic relations and the policies of major powers all influence the environment in which a state is governed.

Certain positions adopted by Islamist political forces may encounter scepticism or opposition in international circles. At the same time, opportunities for cooperation with different countries may emerge on the basis of mutual interests.

Therefore, countering external pressure and safeguarding national interests require realistic diplomacy, knowledge of international affairs, competent leadership and a coherent foreign policy. Although ideological positions are important, they must be effectively reconciled with international realities. Here, too, unity among scholars alone is insufficient.

## Ninth,

Assuming state power requires a strong economic, organisational and institutional foundation. A political force cannot rely solely on the propagation of its ideology, religious sentiment or public rallies. It needs a nationwide organisation, trained personnel, an effective system for developing leadership, research and policy institutions, transparent financing, modern communication systems and realistic plans concerning the economy, education, healthcare, agriculture, industry, technology and employment.

In particular, clear policy positions are essential on complex matters such as the national budget, revenue system, banking, foreign trade, investment, poverty alleviation and social security.

Without adequate preparation in these areas, even if state power is acquired, establishing effective, stable and welfare-oriented governance may prove difficult. Therefore, alongside the aspiration to attain power, equal importance must be given to developing the competence required to exercise it.

## Tenth,

Achieving broad national acceptance is difficult without building wider political and social alliances. In a modern state, it is not easy for a political force to establish a lasting national consensus by relying solely on the support of a particular religious or ideological group. The legitimate rights and interests of workers, farmers, professionals, businesspeople, teachers, students, women, young people and different ethnic and religious communities must also be taken into account.

In a diverse society such as Bangladesh, the acceptability of a political programme depends on its ability to ensure justice, the rule of law, citizens' rights, security, economic opportunity and public welfare. Therefore, if the concept of an Islamic state is to be translated into a practical political programme, it must address the concerns, expectations and reasonable questions of the wider population.

Being popular among one's own supporters and emerging as a politically credible alternative at the national level are not the same thing.

## Eleventh,

A realistic framework for cooperation needs to be developed among scholars and Islamist political parties that hold differing views. If comprehensive unity is imposed as a precondition for cooperation, the possibility of working together may itself be undermined by existing differences.

Instead, it is possible to identify the areas in which consensus can be achieved, the issues on which differences will remain, and the procedures through which disputes can be resolved. A joint consultative council, regular dialogue, guidelines for avoiding mutual hostility and coordinated programmes on matters of common public interest could be helpful in this regard.

The objective of such cooperation should not be to subordinate one group to another or to eliminate all differences of opinion. Rather, it should be to work together towards shared goals while preserving mutual distinctiveness. In this process, it is also important to develop a culture of policy-based and institutional decision-making in place of personality-centred leadership.

## Twelfth,

Alongside political success, ethical leadership and accountability are equally important. Ordinary people expect leaders who advocate the establishment of an Islamic state to demonstrate honesty, trustworthiness, justice, tolerance and a willingness to engage in self-criticism.

Following fair procedures to resolve internal disputes, maintaining financial transparency, ensuring leadership accountability and behaving responsibly towards those who hold different opinions are also essential components of political credibility. The ethical values that leaders seek to establish at the state level must also be reflected in their own conduct and in the way their organisations are managed.

## In conclusion,

Unity among the pirs, mashayikh and *ulama* is undoubtedly important and desirable. However, it is unrealistic to regard such unity as either the sole or a self-sufficient condition for establishing an Islamic state.

Unity is an important factor in strengthening political power, but it does not guarantee the establishment of a state. Acquiring state power and governing it in a manner that promotes public welfare require a combination of broad public support, electoral confidence, effective public engagement, an acceptable political programme, organisational competence, economic preparedness, administrative capacity, constitutional thinking, and realistic domestic and international strategies.

Therefore, the question is not merely when the pirs, mashayikh and scholars will unite. An even more important question is this: **If such unity is achieved, how will it be translated into public welfare, political confidence, institutional capacity and a realistic programme for governing the state?** And until that unity is achieved, what alternative approaches can be pursued to promote cooperation on shared concerns, expand public engagement and advance political preparedness?

Unity among scholars is certainly necessary. But an even greater question is how prepared they are to transform that unity into an effective political force and the capacity to govern a state in a manner that serves the public interest.

Confronting these questions is essential if the aspiration to establish an Islamic state is to be translated into a realistic political programme.