Can the Ulama’s Political Movement Ever Stand on Its Own Feet?

The political engagement of the ulama has reached a critical juncture that calls for deep introspection.

An inevitable question arises: Can this political movement truly build an independent, effective, and dignified political presence on the strength of its own convictions, ideals, vision, and organizational structures?

Or, instead of establishing themselves as an independent ideological political force, will the ulama continue to be used by others—sometimes through political appeasement, and at other times through the humiliating reality of subservience?

The existing situation offers little reason for optimism.

The political activities of the ulama have yet to acquire a constructive, coherent, and well-planned character. In most cases, their politics revolves around immediate reactions, seasonal excitement, and fragmented emotional impulses. A long-term vision, strategic thinking, and a clear blueprint for governance at the national level remain conspicuously absent.

At times, their political engagement remains confined to the narrow framework of national elections, where emotional slogans and temporary enthusiasm take precedence over constructive programmes and clearly articulated policies.

The ulama community is characterized by diverse divisions, competing schools of thought, and numerous political organizations. Yet, remarkably, this diversity has not been accompanied by a shared minimum political agenda, a clear and phased roadmap, or policies suited to contemporary realities.

Although slogans about establishing Islam and implementing Shariah are heard everywhere, no effective framework, realistic roadmap, or implementable strategy has yet been presented to the nation for achieving these lofty objectives in a manner compatible with the realities of the state, the structure of society, and the international context.

Practical experience reveals another painful truth: a substantial part of the ulama’s political engagement remains preoccupied with criticism rather than constructive thinking about the state.

Within their own ranks, there is persistent mutual blame, abusive exchanges, the transformation of disagreements into hostility, and confrontational battles over religious verdicts and positions. At the same time, allegations of excessive compromise, political appeasement, and subservience towards major secular political forces cannot simply be dismissed.

As a result, the principled conduct, self-respect, and moral stature of leadership—which ought to distinguish the political engagement of the ulama—are increasingly being called into question.

Against this backdrop, one conclusion becomes increasingly clear: unless the ulama’s political engagement moves beyond emotion, slogans, and reactive politics to embrace well-planned, accountable, and future-oriented thinking about the state, establishing itself as a self-reliant and influential political force will remain an exceptionally difficult task.

What is needed today is the courage to engage in honest self-criticism, a firm commitment to structural reform, and a determined resolve not merely to celebrate the glories of the past, but to develop the capacity to shape the future.