A. Adherence to Established Local Practices Grounded in Sharīʿah Evidence
As a general principle, it is undesirable to attempt to introduce practices that differ from established local customs grounded in Sharīʿah evidence.
As a humble student of *Comparative Fiqh*, I have my own thoughts and opinions on various issues. Nevertheless, as a committed adherent of the Ḥanafī madhhab, I have consistently followed its rulings in my personal religious practice, out of respect for established practices in our country. For this reason, I have also faced criticism from some people.
It is worth noting that our pious predecessors and the great imams, when issuing Sharīʿah rulings, would generally give due consideration to established local practices that were grounded in Sharīʿah evidence. They would ordinarily refrain from promoting fatwas that contradicted practices established in a particular region in accordance with the opinion of a qualified mujtahid imam. Nor would they encourage people to act upon such contrary rulings in ways that might create disorder or division within the Muslim Ummah.
On one occasion, Ḥumayd (may Allah have mercy on him) requested Caliph ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (may Allah have mercy on him) to eliminate the differences of opinion among the jurists and unite everyone upon a single position. The Caliph replied:
“I would not be pleased if the Companions had not differed in their opinions.”
He subsequently sent instructions to various regions directing that each community should issue judgments in accordance with the opinions of the jurists of its own region.
— Al-Dārimī
Similarly, when Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd wished to unite the Ummah upon Imām Mālik's *al-Muwaṭṭaʾ*, for the sake of greater unity, Imām Mālik discouraged him from doing so. He explained:
“The Companions of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ dispersed across different regions, and each of them transmitted what they had heard from him. The practice of each region subsequently became established in accordance with what had reached its people from the Messenger of Allah ﷺ. Therefore, you should not compel people to abandon the positions they have followed.”
What is particularly noteworthy here is that Imām Mālik himself differed with other imams on numerous issues. Yet when the Caliph wished to impose his madhhab throughout the Muslim world as an official standard, Imām Mālik did not agree. Instead, he urged that people be allowed to retain the positions established in their respective regions.
For a more detailed discussion of this subject, please refer to my book *Comparative Fiqh*.
B. Tolerance Towards Those Who Practise According to Differing Opinions
Just as it is generally undesirable to attempt to establish practices that depart from established local customs grounded in Sharīʿah evidence, it is equally inadvisable to categorically reject practices in matters of legitimate scholarly disagreement among the imams.
A well-known maxim in Islamic jurisprudence states:
**لَا يُنْكَرُ الْمُخْتَلَفُ فِيهِ وَإِنَّمَا يُنْكَرُ الْمُجْمَعُ عَلَيْهِ**
“Matters subject to legitimate scholarly disagreement should not be categorically condemned; rather, condemnation is directed towards matters whose impermissibility is established by scholarly consensus.”
Accordingly, if someone is observed practising, in a particular place, according to the opinion of an imam other than the one followed in that region, they should not be blamed or rebuked merely for doing so. Such behaviour would amount to excessiveness and partisan bias (*taʿaṣṣub*).
Although the great mujtahid imams differed on various issues on the basis of their independent reasoning and *ijtihād*, they did not regard those who practised according to opinions different from their own as blameworthy merely on that account.
Amīr al-Muʾminīn fī al-Ḥadīth, Sufyān al-Thawrī (97–161 AH; may Allah have mercy on him), said:
**إِذَا رَأَيْتَ الرَّجُلَ يَعْمَلُ الْعَمَلَ الَّذِي قَدِ اخْتُلِفَ فِيهِ، وَأَنْتَ تَرَى غَيْرَهُ فَلَا تَنْهَهُ**
“If you see someone performing an act concerning which scholars have differed, and you hold a different opinion, do not forbid him from doing it.”
He also said:
**مَا اخْتَلَفَ فِيهِ الْفُقَهَاءُ، فَلَا أَنْهَى أَحَدًا مِنْ إِخْوَانِي أَنْ يَأْخُذَ بِهِ**
“When the jurists differ over a matter, I do not prevent any of my brothers from adopting any of the opinions concerning it.”
These two statements clearly demonstrate Sufyān al-Thawrī's approach. Despite being a distinguished mujtahid himself, he did not regard the opinions of other qualified mujtahids as necessarily false or illegitimate. His use of the word “brothers” is particularly significant and contains many lessons for us.
Imām Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (450–505 AH; may Allah have mercy on him) states, while discussing the conditions governing the prohibition of wrongdoing:
“The fourth condition is that the act must be an acknowledged wrong, and its wrongfulness must not be a matter subject to *ijtihād*. Therefore, if the wrongfulness of an act is a matter of scholarly disagreement based on *ijtihād*, one should not prevent someone from doing it.
“For example, a follower of the Ḥanafī madhhab has no right to prevent a follower of the Shāfiʿī madhhab from eating the meat of a monitor lizard, a hyena, or an animal slaughtered without pronouncing the *basmalah*, because these are permissible according to the Shāfiʿī madhhab, even though they are not permissible according to the Ḥanafī madhhab.
“Similarly, a follower of the Shāfiʿī madhhab has no right to prevent a follower of the Ḥanafī madhhab from drinking *nabīdh* that does not cause intoxication, because such *nabīdh* is permissible according to the Ḥanafī madhhab, although it is not permissible according to the Shāfiʿī madhhab.”
These statements by the eminent imams demonstrate that anyone seeking to forbid a practice must first establish that the matter in question is unequivocally regarded by the scholars as prohibited or reprehensible by consensus.
Where the imams differ over whether something is lawful or unlawful, permissible or impermissible, it is inappropriate to prevent someone from acting contrary to one's own madhhab merely because that person follows a different legitimate scholarly opinion.
Consider the following example.
Suppose you are studying Islamic knowledge in al-Masjid al-Nabawī in Madinah. You notice someone entering the mosque after the ʿAṣr prayer and beginning to perform ṣalāh. You believe that no prayer should be performed after ʿAṣr.
If you intend to stop that person, you must first establish the positions of the imams on this matter. If you discover that Imām al-Shāfiʿī (may Allah have mercy on him) permits prayer after ʿAṣr under certain circumstances, it would be inappropriate to prevent the person from praying.
The person might reasonably ask: “Why should I not pray?”
You might respond that, according to three of the four imams, prayer is not to be performed at that time. The person could then reply: “But I follow the Shāfiʿī madhhab, which permits prayer after ʿAṣr in certain circumstances. Your madhhabs are not superior to mine.”
You might then cite a hadith concerning the prohibition of prayer at that time. The other person, however, might cite another hadith:
**إِذَا دَخَلَ أَحَدُكُمُ الْمَسْجِدَ فَلَا يَجْلِسْ حَتَّى يُصَلِّيَ**
“When any one of you enters the mosque, he should not sit down until he has prayed.”
Thus, you could easily become embroiled in an unnecessary dispute that would be better avoided.
It is reported that on one occasion, Imām Mālik (may Allah have mercy on him) entered al-Masjid al-Nabawī after the ʿAṣr prayer and sat down without performing the two rakʿahs of *Taḥiyyat al-Masjid* (the prayer of greeting the mosque), in accordance with his own legal position.
A young boy addressed him, saying:
“Shaykh, stand up and perform two rakʿahs of prayer!”
Imām Mālik immediately stood up and performed the two rakʿahs. When he was subsequently asked about this, he replied:
**خَشِيتُ أَنْ يَصْدُقَ قَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى: وَإِذَا قِيلَ لَهُمُ ارْكَعُوا لَا يَرْكَعُونَ**
“I feared that the words of Allah Most High might apply to me:
‘And when it is said to them, “Bow down,” they do not bow down.’”
— The Qur’an, 77:48
What is particularly striking is that an imam of Imām Mālik's stature did not stubbornly insist upon his own opinion merely because the advice came from a young boy. Instead, without entering into a dispute with him, he acted upon the boy's suggestion.
For a more detailed discussion of this subject, please refer to my book *Comparative Fiqh*.
C. Showing Respect for Religious Sentiments
Within the limits of the Sharīʿah, it is also desirable, where circumstances warrant, to show consideration for people's religious sentiments—even when doing so differs from one's personal opinion or the position of one's own madhhab—provided there is at least one sound piece of Sharīʿah evidence supporting the practice.
The prominent Ḥanafī hadith scholar and jurist Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī (762–855 AH; may Allah have mercy on him) writes concerning the funeral prayer of Imām Abū Ḥanīfah (may Allah have mercy on him):
“Because of the enormous crowd attending his funeral, the funeral prayer was performed six times on the day of his death. After his burial, Caliph al-Manṣūr came and performed the funeral prayer beside his grave. It is also reported that, following the burial of Imām Abū Ḥanīfah, people continued performing the funeral prayer beside his grave for twenty consecutive days.”
— *Maghānī al-Akhyār*, vol. 5, p. 165
It is noteworthy that no report is known to me indicating that the prominent Ḥanafī jurists of that period issued a fatwa condemning these practices on the grounds that they showed insufficient respect for people's emotions.
This is particularly significant because, according to the Ḥanafī madhhab, repeatedly performing the funeral prayer for the same deceased person and offering the absentee funeral prayer (*Ṣalāt al-Ghāʾib*) are generally considered impermissible or reprehensible under the relevant legal conditions.
The history of Islam also records that the funeral prayers of several eminent medieval scholars—including Ibn Taymiyyah, ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn ʿAbd al-Salām, and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (may Allah have mercy on them)—were performed on multiple occasions, and absentee funeral prayers were offered for them in different places.
It is also reported that more than 150 funeral prayers were performed for Ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) in various places, both within and beyond his homeland.
According to the madhhabs followed by these scholars, performing funeral prayers on multiple occasions and offering absentee funeral prayers was permissible under the relevant circumstances. Nevertheless, I am not aware of reports indicating that jurists belonging to other madhhabs at the time condemned these practices out of disregard for the sentiments of the people.
Accordingly, there is nothing inherently wrong with showing consideration for people's religious sentiments in light of the circumstances, provided that the practice in question is supported by at least one sound piece of Sharīʿah evidence or is upheld by a recognized madhhab.
That said, it is important to distinguish between accommodating a practice in a particular context and attempting to generalize it or establish it as a universal norm. As a general principle, it is not advisable to turn an occasional, sentiment-driven practice into an established customary requirement.
The appropriate course is therefore to balance adherence to the Sharīʿah, respect for legitimate scholarly disagreement, and sensitivity to people's religious sentiments—without allowing any of these considerations to become a source of unnecessary division within the Ummah.